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24 October 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Reber

SUBJECT: CIA Operations Analysis Handbook

An examination of the Operations Analysis Handbook for the month of September 1950, indicates the existence of many problems and deficiencies. In most cases these problems are not appearing for the first time in this book, which indicates that if any action were taken before, it did not correct the situation. Consequently it is felt that the problems and deficiencies brought to light in the September copy of this book should be studied to see if they can be solved or corrected. It is not believed that the problems are of such a nature that COAPS should take action without further study. Future issues of this handbook should be examined for new problems or for satisfactory settlement of old ones. It goes without saying that there are other problems confronting CIA, but the following are some that become apparent from a study of this handbook:

1. Office of Collection and Dissemination - Liaison Division  
Results of Collection Action

An examination of this chart indicates that for the period of January to September 1950 inclusive, there were a total of approximately one thousand requirements successfully completed by the Liaison Division. During the same time there were over four hundred requirements that were withdrawn or listed as guide type requirements. Further examination throughout this book indicates that most of this number were requirements that were withdrawn prior to a successful completion. It appears that OCD is expending a great deal of effort, that could be put to a more worthwhile purpose, only to have a project called off by the originator of the requirement at a later date.

It is recommended that a study be made to see if there is not some way to cut down on the number of requirements sent to OCD that later prove unnecessary and are withdrawn.

2. Office of Operations - Foreign Documents Division  
Analyses of Collection Directives

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An examination of this chart reveals that the rate of receipt of collection directives by this Division exceeds the ability of the Division to complete such directives. Accordingly, the backlog of pending directives is now about five times the average monthly output of the Division and is growing larger. This places the FDD in a poor position to do its best work and also hurts its relationship with the offices that send collection directives to it.

It is recommended that a study be made to see what corrective action can be taken to enable FDD to satisfy in a timely manner, the collection directives sent to it.

3. Office of Scientific Intelligence  
Overseas Field Office

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OSI in its report for September 1950 states that the shortage of competent personnel continues to be the most serious problem of this office despite a high priority, recruiting program. This office is expected to improve the coordination of scientific and technical intelligence activities and to provide a framework for insuring coverage of matters vital to National Security. However, the handicap of a shortage of competent personnel will seriously delay and hamper the activities of this office.

It is recommended that this problem be investigated. Perhaps the priority assigned the recruiting program is not as high as it should be and a little top level push might help.

4. Office of Scientific Intelligence  
Evaluation of Reporting from all Sources

OSI has indicated an evaluation of reporting from all sources by specific fields as follows:

Atomic Energy  
Chemistry  
Physics, Electronics and Geophysics  
Medical  
Research and Development of Military Materiel

These evaluations indicate by source, the strength and weaknesses of reporting in the various critical areas for each type of reporting. An examination of these evaluations indicates

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clearly the shortages and deficiencies of the reporting needed by OSI to adequately perform its functions. Many such weaknesses are well known - the difficulties of obtaining information from the Soviet Union are apparent, yet the fact remains that the Soviet Union is our chief target. Every means must be exploited to secure as much information as possible from that area.

It is recommended that a study be made of this problem to ensure that everything possible is being done to secure the necessary information and to expedite its transmission once it is obtained.

5. Office of Reports and Estimates  
Evaluation of Reporting from all Sources

An examination of ORE's charts and comments on evaluation of reporting indicates that in most critical areas, reporting is inadequate and deficient.

In conjunction with the study on reporting deficiencies for OSI, it is recommended that a study be undertaken to examine the world wide reporting deficiencies as evaluated by ORE to see what can be done to improve the reporting necessary for the production of National and Departmental intelligence.

6. Office of Reports and Estimates  
IAC Performance in meeting Deadlines on ORE  
Reports

An examination of this chart indicates that in a great percentage of cases, deadlines were not met by the IAC agencies in commenting on ORE reports. If ORE is to do its job, it must have cooperation from all the IAC agencies, and in the failure to meet deadlines we have a good example of the difficulties ORE has been having.

It is recommended that a study be made to see what can be done to improve this situation. Perhaps the system to obtain comments or concurrence should be changed. At any rate an examination of the situation might find a solution to an old problem.

7. Office of Reports and Estimates -  
National Intelligence Survey Division  
Actual and Scheduled Production by IAC Agencies


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An examination of this chart indicates that all agencies have consistently failed to meet their commitments and that production has dropped off seriously during the last few months.

A study should be initiated to evaluate the entire NIS program. The history of the NIS has been one of a failure to meet commitments and of a revision of schedule accordingly. If the importance of the NIS is as great as has been indicated, some solution should be found to carry its production through on a definite schedule.



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